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ABSTRACT 
 
This study focuses on Sit and go poker tournaments, where a player with 
an advantage over her opponents needs to manage her bankroll properly. The 
study applies the Kelly criterion to games that have several outcomes, where 
the organizer charges a rake. The premise is that an advantage itself is not 
enough for a poker player to play at any stakes, because risking too large a 
fraction of the bankroll will result in a negative expected growth rate, even 
though the game itself is characterized by a positive expected value. 
Accordingly, this study uses a formula-based approach to address the 
challenge of identifying games where the player’s current bankroll has the 
highest expected growth rate, while also considering differences in the rake. 
 
Keywords: Bankroll management; gambling; Sit and go poker tournaments; 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well known that the game of poker includes elements of skill as well 
as elements of luck (Levitt & Miles, 2014; Croson et al., 2008; Sklansky, 
1999). Hence, even though the outcome of a poker game in the short term is 
determined by chance to a large extent, poker players benefit in the long run 
from being good at the game. According to Browne (1989), three qualities are 
required for long-term success in skill-based gambling games such as poker: 
strong knowledge of the theoretical mechanics of the game, the ability to 
prevent emotions from negatively affecting play (e.g., to avoid 'tilt'), and the 
ability to manage the bankroll properly.  
There is a lot of scientific literature on the mechanics of poker (e.g., 
Bowling et al., 2015; Chen & Ankenman, 2006; Ferguson & Ferguson, 2003; 
von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), and some on the emotional aspects of 
the game (e.g., Palomäki et al., 2014; Palomäki et al., 2013; Hopely and 
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Nicki, 2010), but very little on bankroll management, that is, how to 
determine the right fraction of the bankroll to put at risk in a particular 
advantageous poker related situation. The only journal article with bankroll 
management in a poker context as the main issue seems to be Lantz (2015), 
where the WSOP main event 2014 was analyzed as an example of a large 
poker tournament with a relatively 'steep' payout structure. In this paper, we 
look at bankroll management in a Sit and go (SnG) poker tournament context, 
that is, small tournaments with relatively 'flat' payout structures. Unlike large 
tournaments with many different payout levels, small tournaments with only a 
few payout levels can be analyzed more generally and with an explicit 
formula based approach. To do so is the aim of this paper. 
The seasoned long-term winning poker player knows that it makes sense 
to play at higher stakes than normal when the advantage (i.e., the expected 
value of the game) is larger than normal (“to take a shot against the fish”, as 
some players would put it). Such a player also knows that the rake level is an 
important factor in determining her actual advantage in the game. While the 
rake level rarely appears as an explicit variable in studies on optimal decision 
making in gambling, the advantage level frequently does (which is a bit of a 
paradox in that the true rake structure is a known factor in almost all types of 
games, while the true advantage level is often hard to determine in practice, 
especially when playing against other human players, as in poker). This paper 
models the bankroll management problem that advantageous SnG players 
have to consider, with the rake level as an explicit variable. 
In a seminal paper, Kelly (1956) modeled the relation between the 
advantage the player has in a game and the stakes at which she should play 
the game. The basic idea is that an advantage player in any type of game is 
expected to increase her bankroll to a certain amount in the fewest possible 
bets if she maximizes the expected growth rate of the bankroll. The classical 
Kelly criterion provides the player with a simple yet elegant formula that 
shows that in an advantageous game with two possible outcomes (i.e., win x 
dollars with probability p and lose y dollars with probability 1-p, where y(1-p) 
< xp), the player maximizes the expected growth rate of the bankroll by 
betting a fraction of her bankroll corresponding to the advantage (i.e. the 
expected value) divided by the payout of the winning bet. For example, 
assume that a sports wager that pays 15 to 2 has a 13% chance of winning. 
The advantage is then 15*0.13-2*(1-0.13) = 0.21. Thus, a Kelly player would 
in this situation bet 0.21/15 = 0.014 = 1.4% of her current bankroll in order to 
maximize the expected growth rate of the bankroll. Betting less means that the 
player does not maximize her opportunity to win money. On the other hand, 
betting more means that the variance in the expected future bankroll becomes 
too large in relation to the expected growth. In fact, betting more than 2.88% 
of the current bankroll in this example actually leads to a negative expected 
growth rate of the bankroll because of the elevated risk even though the game 
is advantageous to the player in terms of a positive expected value. Hence, 
from an economical point of view, a positive expected value is a necessary but 
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not a sufficient condition for participation in a certain poker tournament. A 
positive expected growth rate of the bankroll is also required. 
However, when a game has more than two outcomes, like many types of 
poker tournaments do, the classical Kelly formula does not work. For 
example, assume a wager that pays 10 to 1 with a 5% probability and 2 to 1 
with a 20% probability. The advantage is then 10*0.05+2*0.20-1*(1-0.05-
0.20) = 0.15, but since there is no unambiguous payout to divide the 
advantage by, the classical Kelly formula cannot be used to find the optimal 
fraction of the bankroll to bet. The technical reason is that more outcomes 
create additional variance in the expected future bankroll. Intuitively, it is 
easy to understand that the optimal fraction of the bankroll to bet in a single 
game should be smaller when the risk is higher (other things being equal). But 
how much smaller? 
Recently, Barnett (2011) applied the Kelly criterion when multiple (more 
than two) outcomes exist in a video poker context. In line with Kelly (1956), 
Barnett claims that the expected growth rate of the bankroll has a unique 
maximum, where the first derivative of the expected growth rate of the 
bankroll equals zero. While this claim certainly is true, Barnett does not 
provide detailed examples on how players can use it in practice to find the 
optimal fraction of the bankroll to bet in a single play. In other words, no 
explicit formula where the player could input odds and probabilities was 
presented. 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how the Kelly principle can be 
used in practice as a bankroll management tool in advantageous games with 
multiple outcomes in general and in Sit and go poker tournaments in 
particular, and model the significance of the rake level in a Kelly context. 
This methodology can be used by advantage players to determine a suitable 
level at which to play given their current bankroll. 
 
2. HEADS-UP SNG WITHOUT RAKE 
 
In a poker tournament context, there are numerous situations where there 
are exactly two outcomes for any participating player, including heads-up 
(HU) SnG tournaments, where one player eventually wins the other players’ 
buy-ins, or a satellite tournament, where a small fraction of the field 
eventually shares the value of the prize pool equally (often a number of seats 
in a more prestigious tournament). 
Assume that an advantage player will win a game with probability p and 
that the odds of the game are b to 1 (i.e., the player’s bankroll will increase by 
b units if she wins and decrease by 1 unit otherwise). If x is fraction of the 
bankroll the player bets, the expected growth rate g(x) of the bankroll is 
)1log()1log()1()( bxpxpxg  . The optimal fraction of the 
bankroll to bet is given by 
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which simplifies to bbpx /)1)1((  , which is the classical Kelly formula 
(Kelly, 1956). For example, what fraction of her bankroll should a player risk 
in a SnG tournament with four players where the winner takes all if the 
probability of winning is 28%? The Kelly criterion provides us with the 
answer: 3/)1)13(28.0( x  = 0.04 = 4%. In other words, the player 
should play at stakes where the current bankroll corresponds with 1 / 0.04 = 
25 buy-ins. Hence, if the player's current bankroll is $500, she should look for 
a tournament where the buy-in is $500 / 25 = $20. 
 
3. HEADS-UP SNG WITH RAKE 
 
In a HU SnG tournament without rake, the odds are 1 to 1 by definition, 
so the game must be characterized by p > 0.5 in order for the player to have an 
advantage. If the player also has to pay a rake (i.e., she has to pay a fee to the 
house on top of her buy-in), p obviously needs to be higher. If the buy-in is 
denoted by d and the rake percentage is denoted by r, the player faces d to 
d(1+r) odds. Thus, in terms of the normal odds, b to 1, we have b = d/(d(1+r)) 
= 1/(1+r). The expected growth rate g(x) of the bankroll is now 
)))1/(1(1log()1log()1()( rxpxpxg  . The optimal fraction of 
the bankroll to bet is given by 
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which simplifies to 1)2(  rrpx , which can be used a formula to find 
the optimal fraction of the bankroll to put at risk. Then, what fraction of her 
bankroll should a player risk in a HU SnG tournament if the probability of 
winning is 53% and the rake level is 5%? The formula provides us with the 
answer: 105.0)205.0(53.0 x  = 0.0365 = 3.65%. In other words, the 
player should play at stakes where the current bankroll corresponds with 1 / 
0.0365 ≈ 27 buy-ins. 
The formula is a particularly useful tool when conducting sensitivity 
analyses. For example, should one play on the same buy-in level when 
switching to another site with worse players but a higher rake level? Or, how 
much higher should a player play with her bankroll when the rake level is 
reduced? For example, if p = 0.51 and r = 0.05, the formula shows that the 
skill advantage does not offset the rake because 
105.0)205.0(51.0 x  = –0.0045 = –0.45%, making the game 
unfavorable for the player. Figure 1 displays, based on the formula, how the 
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number of buy-ins 1/ x depends on the rake level (for 0.00 ≤ r ≤ 0.10) when 
the advantage is p = 0.53 or p = 0.54. For example, if r = 0.03 and p = 0.53, 
the player needs a bankroll with 22 buy-ins. It is clear that the rake level has a 
substantial impact on the required bankroll. 
 
Figure 1: Optimal bankroll size when p = 0.53 or p = 0.54 
 
 
4. GAMES WITH ASYMMETRIC OUTCOMES AND A RAKE 
 
If we add the rake factor to a game with b to 1 odds, where b > 1 (for 
example, a winner-takes-all SnG tournament with three or more players), our 
actual odds are b/(1+r) to 1. The expected growth rate g(x) of the bankroll 
then becomes ))1/(1log())1log()1()( rxbpxpxg  . The 
optimal fraction of the bankroll to bet is given by 
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which simplifies to the formula brrbpx /)1)1((  . Then, for 
example, what fraction of her bankroll should a player risk in a game with 3 to 
1 odds with probability to win p = 30% and a rake of 5%? The above formula 
provides us with the answer: 3/)105.0)105.03(3.0( x  = 0.055 = 
5.5%. The formula can be used to perform sensitivity analyses in a similar 
way as in the previous section. 
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5. GAMES WITH THREE OR MORE OUTCOMES 
 
When there are three or more outcomes in a game, the classical Kelly 
formula does not work since it ignores the additional variance compared to a 
game with only two outcomes. From recommendations regarding bankroll 
management that can be seen on commercial Internet sites, it seems that SnG 
players often use the classical Kelly criterion in their decision making 
anyway, but based on the average payout level rather than the actual payout 
levels. For example, www.sitandgoplanet.com currently recommends the 
formula )1/(* pRpRx  , where R is the expected return on 
investment (ROI) and p is the player’s probability of finishing in the money 
(ITM). However, this is an incorrect use of the Kelly criterion. 
Assume, for example, that a player plays six-handed SnG tournaments 
with two payouts (1/3 of the prize pool to second place and 2/3 to the winner) 
and that she has a 24% probability of finishing second and a 14% probability 
of finishing first. Thus, her bankroll will decrease one buy-in with probability 
62%, increase one buy-in with probability 24%, and increase three buy-ins 
with probability 14%. The expected growth rate of her bankroll then becomes 
)31log(14.0)1log(24.0)1log(62.0)( xxxxg  . The optimal 
fraction of the bankroll to bet is given by  
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which simplifies to x = 0.019 (since x must be positive). Hence, the player 
should risk 1.9% of her bankroll in each game—that is, she should have a 
bankroll with 1 / 0.019 ≈ 53 buy-ins. 
If the above formula from www.sitandgoplanet.com is applied to a game 
with only two outcomes, we get )38.0104.0/(38.0*04.0 x  = 0.023 
since the player’s ROI (or advantage) is R = 0.24*2+0.14*4-1 = 0.04 and the 
probability of finishing ITM is p = 0.24+0.14 = 0.38. This corresponds to a 
bankroll with only 1 / 0.023 ≈ 43 buy-ins. Disregarding the additional 
variance from the different possible payout levels when the player finishes 
ITM makes the player risk too high in each game. 
The expected growth rate of the bankroll for a game with three or more 
outcomes, where at least one outcome is negative and at least one outcome is 
positive, can be written generally as 
 



m
i
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where m is the number of outcomes, ip  is the probability of outcome i, and 
ib  is the profit for outcome i. According to Barnett (2011), the optimal 
fraction of the bankroll to bet is given by  
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However, this theorem cannot be used to derive a closed-form formula for 
x for the general situation where m ≥ 3. Each game must be analyzed 
individually. For example, we can derive a formula for x for a six-handed SnG 
with two payouts (1/3 of the prize pool to second place and 2/3 to the winner). 
If p2 is the probability of finishing second and p1 is the probability of winning, 
the expected growth rate of the bankroll is 
)31log()1log()1log()1()( 1221 xpxpxppxg  . The 
optimal fraction of the bankroll to bet is given by 
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which simplifies to x =  
3/)2231446129( 121
2
1212
2
2  pppppppp , where 
the relevant solution is the smallest positive value of x. This formula 
illustrates the fact that an ROI of, for example, 5% in this type of tournament 
says very little about how large the player’s bankroll should be.  
 
Table 1: The relations between 𝒑𝟏, 𝒑𝟐, and x for players with a ROI of 5% 
 
p1 p2 x 1 / x 
0.000 0.525 0.0500 20 
0.020 0.485 0.0438 23 
0.040 0.445 0.0389 26 
0.060 0.405 0.0349 29 
0.080 0.365 0.0316 32 
0.100 0.325 0.0288 35 
0.120 0.285 0.0265 38 
0.140 0.245 0.0245 41 
0.160 0.205 0.0227 44 
0.180 0.165 0.0212 47 
0.200 0.125 0.0199 50 
0.220 0.085 0.0188 53 
0.240 0.045 0.0177 56 
0.260 0.005 0.0168 60 
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As Table 1 indicates, an offensive player with a ROI of 5% who often 
wins but who also frequently finishes out of the money typically needs a 
much larger bankroll than a defensive player who often finishes in second 
place even though she also has an ROI of 5%.  
If there is a rake in the above six-handed SnG tournament, the expected 
growth rate of the bankroll becomes 
)31log()1log())1(1log()1()( 1221 xpxpxrppxg  . 
The optimal fraction of the bankroll to bet is then given by 
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which simplifies to   ))1(6/(2  rbaax , where 
 
 a = 44463 1122  rprpprp  
 b = )142)(33(4 1122  rprpprpr  
 
and the relevant solution is the smallest positive value of x. As one might 
expect, the math quickly becomes messier as the number of outcomes 
increases. This illustrates the need for good approximations of the Kelly 
criterion in situations with many outcomes. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
There are three factors that work together to determine the optimal 
bankroll management policy for a SnG tournament player: the rake level, the 
value of the different payouts (i.e., how 'steep' the payout structure is), and the 
probability distribution of the outcomes. A seasoned and long-term winning 
player knows intuitively that these factors matter, but the exposition in this 
paper shows how the relations between the factors can be analyzed with an 
explicit formula approach. The results here can be applicable to poker players’ 
bankroll management in general, and perhaps to conducting sensitivity 
analyses in particular. They are also applicable to other types of advantageous 
games with three or more outcomes. 
The main difficulty when it comes to the practical application of the ideas 
discussed here is, of course, the estimation of the probability distribution of 
the outcome of the tournament. Factors such as the rake level, the number of 
opponents, and the value of the different payouts are obviously known to all 
players, but it is rarely possible for a player to know her own true probability 
to win, to become second, and so on. The typical approach used by many 
professional players is to use estimates based on previous experience from 
many similar tournaments, but the problem is that unusually good or 
BANKROLL MANAGEMENT IN SIT AND GO POKER TOURNAMENTS 
 
 
9 
unusually bad players may have been present to play at specific times. It is 
still important to have good estimates of the probabilities, however, because, 
as we have seen in this paper, small errors may result in large differences 
regarding the optimal fraction of the bankroll to put at risk. 
The use of the Kelly principle in bankroll management also highlights the 
importance of a dynamic approach: that is, the player needs to immediately 
re-evaluate the stakes at which she should when the size of her bankroll 
increases or decreases substantially. However, her true advantage may also 
differ at different stakes—this leads to a kind of circular reasoning given that 
one obviously has to adapt to the actual levels offered. Given a certain 
bankroll size, the player’s advantage at a certain level may be too large (or 
small) in terms of the fraction of the bankroll that is actually put at risk, but it 
may be too small at the next higher level (or too large at the next lower level) 
for the player to be able to play effectively because her opponents are, on 
average, better (or worse). Very good players may of course be able to 
compensate for this effect by using a slightly more defensive (or offensive) 
strategy without significantly changing their ROI, which, as we have seen, 
reduces (or increases) the number of buy-ins needed to play at a certain level. 
A macro-level interpretation of the analysis in this paper is that poker sites 
need to adapt their rake strategy when the popularity of poker subsides and 
mostly better players are still playing. When inferior players drop out, the 
relative advantage of the remaining profitable players is reduced, and, perhaps 
more importantly, players who previously had a small advantage become 
losing players. In order to keep the industry alive, the poker sites will 
eventually have to lower their rakes to counteract this effect so that a 
significant fraction of the player collective can expect to make money. The 
poker industry will hardly survive if only a few players are profitable. 
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